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Introduction
Thousands of fighters from at least eight African states and several insurgent groups
are involved in a war in Congo-Kinshasa since 1998. This article investigates the context
and dynamics of the war to determine the reasons for the conflict. The outcome of the
conflict is still unpredictable at the time of writing and the article tentatively explores the
chance for stability in Africa's third largest country.
The article begins with an analysis of the country's political order, the economic
framework, regional dynamics, the impact of the rebellion of 1996-1997, Kabila's rule
and the volatile security situation by 1998. The rebellions of 1996-1997 and 1998 are
compared and the escalation of the 1998 rebellion into a regional war is traced. Finally,
the article looks at the prospects for regional peace and stability in Congo-Kinshasa.
The political order
Congo-Kinshasa, to be distinguished from neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville, is also
known as Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko and as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) under Kabila. The vast territory of 2,35 million square kilometers, limited
technological ability and a large diverse population of 45 million people have limited the
scope of post-colonial state control in Congo-Kinshasa.!
The political order consists, in the first place of inherited colonial state structures.
Mobutu took over the state in a military coup d'etat in 1965 and ruled for 32 years.
Mobutu, together with a small network of associates, mostly from Mobutu's Ngwandi
group, controlled the capital of Kinshasa? However, while the presidential network had
information about what was going on in the rest of the country, there was a limited ability
to implement policies outside the capital.
Much of the weakness of the state structures to implement policies was related to
neo-patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism means that, in spite of the colonial insertion of
bureaucratic state structures, patrimonial features have persisted. Some patrimonial
features of the rule of Mobutu included no clear distinction between public and private
spheres and a strong personalisation of power relationships around Mobutu.3
Solomon, H., "From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Towards post-Mobutuism" in
Africa Insight 27 (2), 1997, pp. 91-97.
Weiss, H., "Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Polity", in Zartman, I. (ed.), Collapsed
States - The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, 1995), pp. 157-170.
See also Chabal, P., Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (London 1992), p. 216.
Williame, J.-c., "Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobutu and Two Political Generations", in Welch, C.
(ed.), Soldier and State in Africa: a comparative analysis of military intervention and political
252 Scientia Militaria 28(2) - 1998
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 2, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
Legitimation of the political system occurred through costly patronage of some clients
while the eastern provinces were excluded from the same benefits of patronage.
The weakness of the neopatrimonial state revealed its narrow symbiosis with a
limited number of social networks, dominated by people from the Ngwandi group.
However, under Mobutu the state was especially weak because the presidential network
exceeded the norms of reciprocity, inherent in patron-client ties, and made excessive use
of state structures for private profit.4
Apart from central state structures, some local power structures from the pre-
colonial and colonial era persisted in the post-colonial state. Regional and ethnic
consciousness among the 250 language groups were not only political forces in
themselves in the country, but even more a channel through which competition for
wealth, power and status was expressed.5
Some local power structures in Katanga/Shaba, Kasai and the eastern Kivu
provinces crystallized around resources, trade routes and clan networks and became
virtually semi-autonomous over time. Competition and conflict over resources, including
three percent arable land and rich reserves of diamonds, cobalt and copper, remained a
strong driving force of politics in local and state structures in the country.
The concentration of control over many resources in state structures and the
exclusion of different groups from the benefits of state patronage made it attractive to
excluded groups to try and take over the state. Several regional rebellions, coup attempts
and other forms of dissent therefore marked Mobutu's rule. However, a security force
separate from the regular military, the Special Presidential Division (DSP), and especially
French support allowed Mobutu to retain his grip on Kinshasa for decades.
In the nineties riots almost unseated Mobutu. Under pressure, Mobutu had to share
power in new democratic structures. Mobutu re-established some of his authority over
his opponents by different methods of division, deception and patronage.6 However, by
1996, as the state's income dropped, Mobutu had increasingly less money to buy off
opposition and to ensure allegiance by client networks.
The economic framework
Already since the end of the eighties the country experienced a rapid decline in its
formal economic sphere, with a significant drop in measurable mining and agriculture
output and a reduced tax base.7 As a consequence, the government under Mobutu tried to
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finance budgetary deficits by printing money, which led to hyperinflation exceeding 650
percent in 1996.
Apart from taxation, foreign aid also was an importan\ source of state income.
However, Western countries, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund began
to follow a gradualist approach to aid, premised on progress in economic and political
reforms. The conditions of aid were not met in all cases and Mobutu sporadically put
pressure on multinational and local firms in order to increase income and to promote
political objectives.8
Informal markets provided a means to escape the predatory state, and both
multinational and local firms dealt with the surging informal economic sphere. However,
informal markets in the country did not only provide a means to escape a predatory state.
When power appeared to recede in inefficient administrative structures, Mobutu, whose
family was involved in the diamond trade, also sought opportunities and resources for
supporters in informal markets. The state's resource base was weakened but the state
endured because of the networks and alliances that were built.9
The presidential network used its links to the formal and informal economy for
enrichment. The wealth was used for private purposes, to build patron-clients relations
and to buy off some opposition. Wealth was often not used for development but rather
used to establish symbolic authority over competing networks by conspicuous
consumption. As a result, infrastructure outside Kinshasa was often allowed to decay,
which meant that the eastern Kivu provinces became virtually cut off from central state
services.
Regional dynamics
The weakness of state structures led to a loss of political control over the population
and over economic space in the Kivu provinces. Currencies of neighbours like Rwanda
and Uganda were used and a vast informal trade zone existed. 10 Neighbouring rulers and
their clients had interests in the formal and informal markets.
Congo-Kinshasa shares its land boundaries of IO 000 kilometers with eight
countries. These states are Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic,
Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia and Angola. There are communities like the Tutsi who live
on both sides of the borders drawn by the European colonial powers during the nineteenth
century. The long shared borders and the fluidity of populations strengthen the effect of
economic and political events in one country on other countries in the region.
Tutsi-Hutu animosities in the region had such a spillover effect. I I In 1994 the
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youth rriilitia occurred in neighbouring Rwanda. Only an exile Tutsi military under Paul
Kagame stopped the genocide, but fear of revenge by the Tutsi caused over a million
Hutus to pour into the east of Congo-Kinshasa.
Thousands of Rwandan Hutu ex-soldiers and militiamen settled among the unarmed
Hutus in border camps, and these armed groups used the cover of the refugee camps to
launch attacks against Tutsi settlements in the region. Mobutu provoked the rulers of
Rwanda by not doing anything to separate the refugees from the insurgents or to stop the
attacks from his territory.
Similarly, the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni had to contend with
insurgent groups supported by Sudan and operating from Congo-Kinshasa.12 The
Rwandese vice-president Paul Kagame had been Museveni's chief of intelligence during
the latter's insurgency campaign in Uganda, and the Museveni family also had Tutsi
links.
Ethnic Tutsis have resided for generations in the east of Congo-Kinshasa and have
family and business links in the region. The Mobutu government tried to deprive them of
citizenship and tried to dislodge them from the land they occupied. Local groups like the
Hunde and Nande used the opportunity to violently pursue land claims against these
Tutsis, and when an estimated 2 000 Congolese Tutsis were massacred in 1996, the
Tutsis, Rwanda and Uganda became allies in an enterprise to remove Mobutu from
power.
On 10 October 1996 the rebellion against Mobutu of the Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zai"re (AFDL) started. The AFDL embraced several
groups from Congo-Kinshasa, including a group led by Andre Ngandu Kassasse and a
group led by Laurent Kabila, a veteran guerilla opponent of Mobutu. During previous
years Kabila had become relatively inactive, but he was known to Museveni and used as a
Zai"rean spokesman for the rebellion. 13 Nevertheless, the rulers of Uganda and especially
of Rwanda provided the decisive support for the rebellion.
The rebellion of 1996-1997
The rebellion started in the east and the vanguard of the AFDL forces consisted of
Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis. Mobutu's ill-disciplined and socially fragmented army
was quickly routed in the east. As the AFDL forces advanced through the country, aided
by the logistical ability of their sponsors Uganda and Rwanda, they recruited among the
many teenagers who had marginal roles only in traditional communities and the system of
patronage. 14
As the rebellion continued, Mobutu's forces started to suffer from a lack of
manpower and funding, with much of the military budget siphoned off in corrupt
procurement deals. Eventually France gave three million US dollars to pay for European
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Mobutu got some funds from business supporters, but the AFDL forces were also
able to capture a number of mines and gold reserves. After the AFDL's military progress
in late 1996, various multinational companies preferred to negotiate mining and
commodity concessions with the AFDL in return for tax payments. These deals helped to
fund the AFD L' s increasingly successful rebellion. 16
With funding and with the support of the rulers of Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and
Rwanda, the AFDL started to advance on Kinshasa. Under pressure from the victorious
AFDL forces, Mobutu's generals took control of arms purchases and told Mobutu he was
an impediment to the ending of the war. Mobutu fled soon after and the AFDL installed
Kabila as the new ruler of Congo-Kinshasa in May 1997.
The significance of the rebellion of 1996-1997
The successful rebellion of the AFDL in 1996-1997 influenced the context of the
1998 rebellion. While the rebellion did not change the political system of patronage, the
Tutsi group became the group favoured by the state, substituting Mobutu's Ngwandi
group. The quick and successful campaigns of the rebel forces demonstrated the lack of
patronage-based government authority outside Kinshasa.
Previously France played a very important role in propping up the Mobutu
government in Kinshasa. The outcome of the rebellion meant a setback to French
influence in the region, but the Ugandan and Rwandan rulers also demonstrated their
military ability to influence who will rule the third largest country in Africa. The
rebellion did not change the historical feature that the government in Kinshasa needed
foreign support and mercenaries to survive local challenges to its authority.
In addition, the rebellion meant that the new ruler had financial debts towards the
rulers of Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Zimbabwe, and that the Kabila government had to
honour new contracts, made with mining companies in exchange for financial support
during the rebellion. The cost of the war effort further depleted the limited funds of state
structures and left Kabila with even fewer means to ensure client allegiance.
In addition to limited funds for patronage, Kabila could not rely on a strong
personal network in Kinshasa itself. Most of his officials came from the east or from
exile. Many soldiers of Mobutu's army also survived, forming a nucleus of potential
resistance to the new ruler. The rebellion had the potential to establish a Tutsi zone of
influence, which could accommodate the potentially disruptive Tutsi interests outside the
established state. Eventually, however, the rebellion reinforced the statist framework.
Kabila's rule
In May 1997 Kabila changed the name of the state Zaire to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, during the short period of his rule since he has not
fundamentally changed the political order of Mobutu's 32 years of rule. Kabila's power
still rests on military force, foreign support, patronage and a personal network.
After coming to power, Kabila promised a list of democratic reforms before certain
dates in his inaugural address. However, no deadlines were met and security concerns
remained predominant. Political activity was suspended and Kabila was awarded
absolute power over policy and appointments for a two-year period before elections.
'6
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Kabila invited Sakombi Inongo, the orchestrator of the Mobutu personality cult, as his
communications adviser and Maoist education was introduced for the state
administration. 17
Initially dependent on Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi backing, Kabila soon started
to reduce the influence of the Tutsi and potential adversaries in his administration. People
like the chief of staff of the army and several cabinet ministers were detained on charges
ranging from drug trafficking to corruption, weakening the Kasai and Tutsi leadership
element in the government. 18
At the beginning of January 1998 Kabila carried out a major cabinet reshuffle
where he gave his fellow Katangans decisive influence in the cabinet. Like Mobutu,
Kabila started to build up a personal security unit, this time composed of his fellow
Katangans. Like before, the presidential office and the military also remained the main
beneficiaries of the state budget.
The security situation under Kabila
Kabila wanted to create a new military and faced the challenge of achieving
cohesion. between diverse groups, including exiles from Angola, Katangese youths,
Congolese Tutsi and ex-Mobutu soldiers. The challenge was even greater because
cohesion' had to be improved while local conflicts still raged in the semi-autonomous
Katanga and the eastern provinces.
In September 1997 the Congolese Tutsis were attacked once again by local militias
in the east and thousands fled to Rwanda. Fighting also broke out between Kabila's Tutsi
troops and their colleagues from Katanga. Like Mobutu before, the Kabila government
had no military hierarchy with the ability to control the situation. 19
Kabila's Rwandan-backed forces clashed repeatedly with fighters from the Bembe,
Hunde and Nande groups, who initially formed part of the Tutsi-driven AFDL because
they wanted more autonomy to protect their resources. This time the rebels relied on
Rwandan Hutu forces for weaponry and logistics.
During the ongoing local conflicts, the army of Kabila fragmented into factions
reflecting different social interests?O Different pay scales between Tutsi, Katangese and
ex-Mobutu soldiers, and favouritism towards soldiers from Kabila's home region,
provoked rivalries and clashes. As in Mobutu's time, non-payment of salaries also
became an issue. The economic weakness of state structures made it very difficult to
improve the situation.
Economic achievements and constraints
Kabila inherited an economically weak state, vulnerable to the economic advances
of neighbours in the border regions and scarcely able to implement plans for economic
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The conflict threatened to oust Kabila from power, but the Angolan and
Zimbabwean forces saved Kabila and stopped the RCD advance on the western front,
where Angola suffered substantial losses. The Angolan forces have been deployed only
in defence of Angolan security interests in the western Congo-Kinshasa, while the
Zimbabwean forces have also been deployed in the east. The number of deployed
Zimbabwean troops have also increased substantially since the beginning of Zimbabwean
involvement.
Angola and Zimbabwe are the most important allies of Kabila, but he has also
found allies in Namibia, Sudan and Libyan-funded Chad. Kabila has tried to increase the
manpower of his alliance by recruiting Tanzanian and Hutu soldiers. In addition, aid
from military firms may also occur if the Kabila government is able and willing to pay for
it. Kabila has therefore succeeded in combining a broad alliance of forces on his side.
The broadness of Kabila 's alliance has made military co-ordination more important
but also more difficult, especially because of the condition of the Congolese forces.
Kabila's forces do not have a strong military intelligence apparatus, because of the
destruction of Mobutu's apparatus in 1996-1997. Allegations of widespread bribery by
rebels, absence from military action and alienation of the civilian population by looting,
previously made against Mobutu's soldiers, are now made against Kabila's troopS.28
Somewhat in contrast, the troops of Angola and Zimbabwe are considered to be
among the better forces in Africa. Angola, Zimbabwe and Sudan also have some military
capability in the air, whereas Uganda and Rwanda have virtually none.29 Nevertheless,
the advantages of Kabila' s allies have not necessarily had a huge impact.
Some of the allied troops are not used to the tropical local conditions. The tropical
climate's unpredictability, heavy rains, landmines and bad roads have undermined
planning and have impeded the large-scale movement of mechanised troops. RCD forces
have also launched surprise offensives under the cover of bad weather to neutralise the air
advantage ofKabila's allies.
Eventually, any substantial military progress against the RCD will depend on the
non-Congolese partners of Kabila's alliance. Without the support of foreign powers,
Kabila, like Mobutu during his 32 years of rule, would have been overthrown already.
However, because of major foreign involvement, the rebellion has quickly escalated into
a full-blown war involving most state and sub-state security actors in the region. The
degree of involvement of the major actors has also escalated during this time.
The rebel-dominated zone of influence
On the rebel side, the military rulers of Rwanda and Uganda have been the major
foreign actors. Similar to the rebellion of 1996-1997, the Rwandan Tutsi rulers considered
threats to Congolese Tutsi interests in 1998 as the signal to project military power in the
east of the Congo. The security of Tutsi communities in the whole region is the prime
motivation for Rwandan participation in the 1998 conflict.
Much of the fighting of the RCD forces is still being done by Rwandan and
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and military support from the USA and have strong logistical capabilities. 3D The early
deployment of substantial Ugandan forces deep inside the Congo distinguishes the 1998
conflict from the 1996-1997 conflict, when Uganda's involvement was less visible.
Similar to 1996-1997, Museveni wants to weaken the Congo-based Ugandan rebel groups
on the Congolese side of the border. However, Ugandan troops also fought soldiers from
Chad at Bulia, Equateur, some.1 400 kilometers from the Ugandan border. 3 I This
incongruity may indicate military necessity or personal animosity towards Kabila, who
turned against his erstwhile mentor Museveni.
Museveni and the Rwandan rulers have also played an important role in the creation
and maintenance of the alliance against Kabila. While the Congolese Tutsi clearly
formed the dominant element in the AFDL in 1996-1997, this time former members of
the Mobutu army and politicians from Equateur are involved, also in Jean Pierre Bemba's
Congolese Liberation Movement. Leadership rivalries and faction fighting have occurred
among the rebel groups since late 1998, while deadly clashes have occurred between
Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers who disagreed over which rival rebel group should be
supported.32
The rebel alliance quickly established control over eastern Congo-Kinshasa.
However, during the first six months of the conflict, the RCD forces have lost some of
their momentum, in contrast to the AFDL forces that more or less maintained their
momentum during the seven month campaign of the 1996-1997 rebellion. Similar to the
1996-1997 rebellion, local Bembe, Hunde and Nande militias temporarily joined Hutu
militias in attacking Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi forces in the east. In reaction, the
rebel alliance is negotiating with some local groups to lessen resistance to the RCD
administration.
The Tutsi presence is just as unpopular as Kabila's rule, and Kabila, like Mobutu in
1996, uses anti-Tutsi sentiment to mobilize support.33 Nevertheless, because of proximity
to the supportive Rwandan Tutsis, ethnic links and business interests the rebel alliance
seems to have a better chance at maintaining some control in the east than the Kinshasa
government ever had.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the rebel alliance will be equally successful
to establish some authority in the Equateur region. The RCD rebel alliance under Wamba
dia Wamba also is not necessarily in control of the Equateur rebel group of Bemba, which
may affect the possibility of an effective ceasefire agreement if negotiations only include
the RCD.
The prospects for regional peace
There are different ways in which the conflict can end, including a military victory,
a ceasefire, a withdrawal of foreign troops and a domestic settlement. At the time of
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The war in Congo-Kinshasa takes place in the Central African region where largely
internal conflicts are also affecting Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan,
Chad and Angola. Therefore, unexpected shifts in the power Qr composition of the
govemmentof a war participant cannot be excluded.
If the war participants agree to a ceasefire, it may not necessarily be a final solution.
At the time of writing, a ceasefire will do little more than freeze the military standoff
between the opposing forces, with the rebel alliance still occupying towns and areas in the
east. However, if the conflict drags on without a decisive victory or defeat, major actors
like Angola or Zimbabwe may begin to consider a withdrawal of their forces.
For Angola, the unexpected surge in UNITA activity since late 1998 may influence
the extent or continuance of force deployment in Congo-Kinshasa. Already a substantial
reduction of Angolan troops in Congo-Kinshasa has occurred. If the UNIT A threat to the
Angolan government becomes very serious, the RCD may be able to negotiate Angolan
neutrality in the Congo in exchange for guarantees regarding oil concessions and the
absence of UNIT A bases in the Congo. If the Angolan forces remain deployed in the
west only, this may be enough for the RCD to survive in the east.
In financially-stricken Zimbabwe, the high cost and limited success of Zimbabwean
offensives against the RCD in the east have aggravated dissatisfaction among the
population and military.34 Mugabe may find that continued participation in the Congo
conflict begins to threaten his hold on power domestically. However, if Mugabe remains
in power, it is possible that he will only withdraw his forces after receiving face-saving
concessions and guarantees regarding concessions and war debts.
In contrast to Zimbabwe, the rulers of Uganda and Rwanda both have border
security interests at stake in the Congo. The entry of Sudan in the conflict constituted an
extra, direct threat to Uganda's security interests. The rulers of Rwanda and Uganda have
gone to war twice in three years in order to safeguard their interests and little thought was
given to the possibility of a negotiated outcome.
Similar to the 1996-1997 rebellion, the military campaign of 1998 did not only aim
at securing the eastern border areas and at containing the insurgent threat from the eastern
provinces. During both rebellions the objective also was to conquer Kinshasa and to
remove the ruler considered responsible for the security threat.
Any permanent withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces is therefore unlikely
unless these security concerns are addressed. The recent history ofTutsi genocide and the
Hutu-Tutsi rivalries in the region mean that Tutsi survival as such is also at stake for the
rulers of Rwanda. Given the strength of grievances and interests on the side of the
Rwandan Tutsi rulers, it is unlikely that the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congo-
Kinshasa will be effected without a settlement that also addresses the domestic political
order in Congo-Kinshasa.
The prospects for stability in the Congo
Congo-Kinshasa still has a neopatrimonial political order based on state patronage
of some groups and networks only. Exclusionary patterns of government patronage and
perceived government harassment of certain regions and groups have regularly led to
conflicts in the past.
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These conflict~ are difficult to resolve. The concentration of control over resources
in state structures also makes it attractive to excluded groups not to settle for less than a
takeover of the state. Elite political pacts and compromise settlements are difficult in
neopatrimonial orders, because of few institutional channels to negotiate rules and power-
sharing. Winner-takes-all struggles tend to be the rule, and the present conflict in Congo-
Kinshasa is no exception.35
The different peace summits of 1998 mostly reflected the features of the winner-
takes-all conflict. The peace summits did not progress beyond the exclusion or alienation
of Congolese rebel interest groups by Kabila. The summits also did not clearly signal a
change in the rebel sentiment that negotiations should only be about the specifics of
Kabila's departure.36
On the one hand, a regional peacekeeping initiative may allow Kabila some respite
to implement reforms. However, Kabila, who is struggling to fund his war effort, does
not have many means to strengthen the political order. In addition, African peacekeeping
forces, operating under financial constraints, will have difficulty to contain conflict
everywhere and may aggravate xenophobia and instability instead.
On the other hand, if all the non-Congolese forces withdraw, local groups in the east
will still be excluded from state patronage and the threat to Tutsis in Congo-Kinshasa and
Rwanda will have remained. The reason for the two major recent conflicts in Congo-
Kinshasa will therefore still exist after a foreign troop withdrawal from the country.
To accommodate the different actors, interests and discourses involved in the
Congolese conflict, a comprehensive political settlement will be necessary. However, the
Kabila government will probably be unable to unable to ensure a stabile political order
providing a proper service to the whole population.
Conclusion
For decades Congo-Kinshasa has had a political order built around military force
and personal rule, excluding different groups in the east from state patronage. The
weakness of state control in the vast country, competing business and ethnic networks and
the concentration of control over resources in state structures resulted in continuous local
conflicts and attempts by excluded groups to take over the state by any means.
One such attempt was the rebellion of Congolese Tutsi and other groups in the east
against Mobutu in 1996-1997. The rebel alliance was backed by Uganda and the Tutsi
rulers of Rwanda, who were trying to protect their interests after the 1994 genocide of
Rwandese Tutsi. The rebellion brought Kabila to power but left him with war debts,
Mobutist dissidents, a smaller power base than Mobutu, a dependence on his military
backers and expectations of state patronage among the Tutsi.
However, Kabila eventually diminished Tutsi influence and built a power base
around his own group from Katanga. Like Mobutu, Kabila did not act against insurgent
groups operating from his country against his previous allies Uganda and Rwanda.
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Shortly after Kabila ordered the withdrawal of Rwandan Tutsi troops, a rebellion led by
Tutsi troops erupted in the east in August 1998.
Congolese Tutsi, Ugandan and Rwandan troops provided the cutting edge of the
new rebel alliance and quickly won control of the east from Kabila's fragmented military.
Kabila was only saved by the military intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe and Sudan,
which resulted in the escalation of the rebellion into a full-blown regional war. The
support of Angola and Zimbabwe made it possible to stop a rebel offensive in the west of
Congo-Kinshasa, but Kabila's allies were unable to drive out the rebels from most of the
east.
On the one hand, the lack of progress against the rebels has increased the already
high cost of the war for the Kabila alliance. The increased UNIT A insurgent onslaught in
Angola and the political turmoil in Zimbabwe have also put additional pressure on
Kabila's allies to either win or settle.
On the other hand, the rebel dominance in the east, as well as the strength of the
perceived interests of Rwanda's Tutsi rulers, make it unlikely that Rwanda will settle for
a lasting peace without a new political dispensation in Congo-Kinshasa too. Such a
political dispensation will need to accommodate the concerns of the eastern provinces and
of the Tutsi too.
However, the impoverished and narrowly' neopatrimonial state structures under
Kabila will probably be unable to implement such a political dispensation in the east. In
addition, neighbouring African rulers now know their ability to establish spheres of
military and business influence in Congo-Kinshasa. To a large degree, the war since
August 1998 reflects the continuing crisis of the state in Congo-Kinshasa. This crisis will
not end with the end of the war.
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